1 ... 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 ... 43

G O V E R N M E N T S   O F   T H E   W O R L D - Guide to Citizens’ Rights and Responsibilities

bet8/43
Sana05.10.2017
Hajmi4.77 Kb.
TuriGuide

G O V E R N M E N T S   O F   T H E   W O R L D


43
K e l s e n ,   H a n s

legal positivism: 

a philosophy that laws
have no moral standing, being merely
man-made
■ ■ ■  

abdicate: 

to renounce or give up power,
usually referring to royalty

The constitution that Kelsen drafted established a parliamentary democ-
racy and included a 
bicameral
legislature and a head of state and a head of
government, the federal chancellor. Notably, the constitution also called for
universal
suffrage
, including for women. The constitution was amended in
1925 and in 1929, but a parliamentary crisis ensued in 1933 with the success
of Austrian fascism. The constitution was suspended in 1938, when Austria was
occupied by Nazi Germany. Kelsen was removed from his academic position
in 1933 and left for Geneva and in 1940 moved to the United States, where he
served as a visiting professor of political science at the University of California
at Berkeley.
After World War II, Austria reinstated the 1920 constitution that Kelsen had
written, together with the 1926 and 1929 amendments. That constitution remains
intact, although it was amended to enable Austria to enter the European Union.
Kelsen died in Berkeley in 1973, but his legacy remains in Europe.

See also: 


Austria; Constitutions and Constitutionalism.

B I B L I O G R A P H Y


Austria Index: International Constitutional Law. 
Ͻhttp://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/
au_indx.html
Ͼ.
Ganse, Alexander. “Austria in Transition, 1918–1920.” World History at KML, 2004.
Ͻhttp://www.zum.de/whkmla/region/germany/au191820.htmlϾ.
Kelsen, Hans. General Theory of Law and State. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1945.
Ladavac, Nicoletta Bersier. “Hans Kelsen (1881–1973): Biographical Note and
Bibliography.”  European Journal of International Law 9, no. 2 (1998):1–8.
Ͻhttp://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol9/No2/art11.htmlϾ.
Mary L. Volcansek

Kenya


Occupying 582,650 square kilometers (224,900 square miles) and located on
the Indian Ocean coast of East Africa—bordered by Tanzania, Uganda, Sudan,
Ethiopia, and Somalia—Kenya had an estimated population in 2004 of 32 million.
As with nearly all African states, none of which existed in their present form
before European powers established colonial territories across the continent at
the end of the nineteenth century, Kenya first emerged as a modern state
between 1895, when it was carved out as part of the British East Africa protec-
torate, and 1902, when it was brought under the Colonial Office. Amalgamating
a diverse set of peoples carrying varied histories and forms of self-government,
the ensuing colonial experience was to have a fundamental effect on the form
of government that was established at independence on December 12, 1963,
and, importantly, on the substance of challenges that have animated politics
ever since. Most easily recognizable are the formal institutions that were inher-
ited at independence, such as parliamentary democracy patterned after the
Westminster
system, a common law tradition, and the colonial administrative
structure. How much these institutions have changed (e.g., the mutation to a
presidential system) and continue to change demonstrates both the limits of the
“colonial imprint” and the lively, sometimes tragic, internal and external forces
beyond colonialism that shape governance in Kenya.
44

G O V E R N M E N T S   O F   T H E   W O R L D


K e n y a

bicameral: 

comprised of two chambers,
usually a legislative body

suffrage: 

to vote, or, the right to vote
■ ■ ■  

Westminster: 

a democratic model of govern-
ment comprising operational procedures for
a legislative body, based on the system used
in the United Kingdom

A U T H O R I TA R I A N I S M   A N D   E N D U R I N G   C H A L L E N G E S


In both colonial and postcolonial times, 
authoritarianism
has been the
dominant style in which governments in Kenya have deployed state power to
manage civic and economic affairs. To be sure, they have faced formidable chal-
lenges and have offered various justifications, often seemingly acceptable in
their time. However, these justifications often later exhibited sufficient contra-
diction to allow the emergence of a countermovement to democratize state
power and to expand economic benefit to a broader population beyond the
ruling elite privileged by race, ethnicity, or class.
The foremost challenge faced by successive governments in Kenya is ethnic
diversity—especially how to forge a cohesive state and how to manage compe-
tition or threats from identities older than the modern state. The colonial
government developed a policy of “indirect rule,” which first evolved in north-
ern Nigeria. This approach involved allowing local traditional authorities—who
were often persons of doubtful character who served as “chiefs,” drawing an
imperial salary and protection—to govern their own peoples on behalf of the
understaffed colonial authority.
These rulers was mainly focused on enforcing colonial tax, labor, and eco-
nomic laws rather than on representing their subjects. This policy redefined

G O V E R N M E N T S   O F   T H E   W O R L D


45
K e n y a

authoritarianism: 

the domination of the
state or its leader over individuals
■ ■ ■  

G


R


E


A


T


R


I


F


T


V


A


L


L


E


Y


Mt. Kenya


17,058 ft.


5199 m.


Chalabi


Desert


Lotikipi


Plain


Dida Galgalu


Desert


Lorian


Swamp


Danissa


Hills


Yatta Plateau


P


A


R


E


  M


T


S


.


Pate I.


Manda I.


Lake


Victoria


Tu


rk


w


el


Ngi


ro


B


o


r


T


a


n


a


Nz


oia


M


ar


a


A


th


i


Galana


D


au


a


INDIAN


OCEAN


Lake


Turkana


Lake


Baringo


Lake


Magadi


Lake


Natron


Ungama


Bay


Malindi


Kericho


Mombasa


Nakuru


Kisumu


Nairobi


Garissa
Meru
Embu
Machakos
Mutha
Voo
Nguni
Mbalambala
Tsavo
Maktau
Thika
Loliondo
Mado Gashi
Gol Bax
Galole
Kwale
Nyeri
Kitale
Kakamega
Karungu
Kisii
Utegi
Musoma
Eldoret
Marsabit
Laisamis
Habaswein
South
Horr
Tarbaj
El Beru Hagia
Takaba
Mega
Lodwar
Kotido
Kaabong
Sabarei
North
Horr
Kakuma
Moyale
Sololo
El Wak
Lamu
¯

E T H I O P I A


U G A N D A


S U D A N


S O M A L I A


T A N Z A N I A


Kenya


W
S
N
E

KENYA


200 Miles
0
0
200 Kilometers
100
150
50
50
100
150
(MAP BY MARYLAND CARTOGRAPHICS/ THE GALE GROUP)

ethnic identities that were historically more fluid rather than fixed. The new
alliances formed the basis for economic, social, and political policies.
By the time the state gained its independence, ethnic identity had become
more concrete; for example, censuses and registration records listed official
ethnic categories. These groups and the estimates of the percentages of the
2005 population are the Kikuyu (22%), Luhya (14%), Luo (13%), Kalenjin (12%),
Kamba (11%), Kisii (6%), and Meru (6%), with other African groups comprising
15 percent and non-African (Asian, European, and Arab) groups 1 percent.
Political parties and personalities arose along these ethnic lines, encouraged by
colonial policies that allowed Africans to form regional parties as a way of delay-
ing
nationalist
politics that were already heating up across the continent after
the World War II (1939–1945). (Africans who had fought on the side of Allied
forces for democracy and against Hitler’s fascism were beginning to question
the racial colonialism they faced at home.)
Confronted by this diversity and its increasingly politicized nature, the
newly independent government, reflecting a liberal optimism that was practi-
cally and ideologically necessary for the anticolonial struggle, sought to remod-
el the nation into one overarching supra-ethnic identity. This effort was more
successful in theory than in practice, however, as parties continued to align and
draw votes ethnically rather than ideologically. The subsequent government also
made numerous efforts to balance ethnic representation in state institutions, for
example, by allocating ministerial and subministerial posts to assure broad rep-
resentation of different ethnic and regional groups. This led to sizeable cabinets
and a disconnected government structure, a situation that got worse as Kenya
moved from a 
de facto
to a 
de jure
one-party state in the 1970s and 1980s. Even
with such efforts at ethnic balance, ethnic dominance was unmistakably pres-
ent, held first by the Kikuyu and related groups under founding president Jomo
Kenyatta (1889–1978) and subsequently by the Kalenjin under Daniel arap Moi
(b. 1924), the second president.
Along with balancing ethnic identity, the second challenge faced by successive
governments in Kenya has been managing the economy. Invariably, in conditions
of colonial advance and anticolonial nationalism, economic policies have been
either combined with or subordinated to political goals rather than to market
forces. Thus, the Kenyan colonial government, although introducing new eco-
nomic activities such as cash-crop agriculture (e.g., tea and coffee) and integrating
the economy into the global market, was narrowly focused on making a profit for
white settlers and the British Empire. It therefore favored white settlers by allocat-
ing the best agricultural lands to them, passing labor laws to encourage them to
use the African workforce in European enterprises, and limiting economic oppor-
tunities for Africans and Asians.
Given that the most productive land was under European control and that
Africans were excluded from cash cropping, land became the critical economic
resource around which the independence movement was propelled. After inde-
pendence, the government attempted to redistribute economic assets and
opportunities to the majority Africans. The most effective redistribution pro-
gram was the Million Acres Scheme, which lasted from 1962 to 1971. Financed
in large part by the British government, it allowed the Kenyan government to
purchase over 1 million acres of land owned by eight hundred white farmers
and distribute it to over thirty-five thousand African families. By the 1980s, over
seventy thousand families had settled on over 2 million acres of land that had
been previously owned by white farmers. Africans who were allocated land were
required to pay a nominal fee, contribute yearly repayments, and put the land
to continuous productive use. (Typically, new landowners would grow at least
46

G O V E R N M E N T S   O F   T H E   W O R L D


K e n y a

nationalism: 

the belief that one’s nation or
culture is superior to all others
■ ■ ■  

de facto: 

(Latin) actual; in effect but not
officially declared

de jure: 

(Latin) by right

one cash crop which was marketed through the government or government-
sponsored cooperatives and which helped pay the nominal fees over time.)
A parallel Africanization policy provided employment and entrepreneurial
opportunities for Africans through a growing state-owned enterprise sector as
well as other forms of state-sponsored economic growth (e.g., expansion of

G O V E R N M E N T S   O F   T H E   W O R L D


47
K e n y a

A KENYAN WOMAN SITS INSIDE HER HUT WITHIN KIPAO VILLAGE. 


Twenty-four years of
oppressive economic tactics by Daniel arap Moi and the Kenya African National Union
(KANU) and led to great hardships, particularly in the poorer rural areas. Village
women were forced to bear much of the burden as men left for urban areas to find
work.
(SOURCE: DAVID JOHNSON. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.)

administrative services, armed services, and social services to the public). The
state also invested in enterprises ranging from trading houses, manufacturing, and
cooperatives to services such as banking, transport, and telecommunications. At
a time when 
socialism
was popular across the continent but had yet to be econom-
ically proven, Kenya’s government professed a pursuit of African Socialism, as
expressed in its cornerstone policy document, Sessional Paper No. 10 (1965),
titled African Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya. In both theo-
ry and practice, however, the government’s policy called for a guided 
market
economy
, which supported capitalist growth and the consolidation of an African
political and economic elite.
The successful management of the economy masked a growing authoritarian-
ism, however, which over the next two decades would begin to unravel the state’s
economic, social, and political achievements. Initially, Kenya benefited from a
rapidly expanding economy, with an average gross domestic product (GDP)
growth rate of 6.5 percent during the first decade and over 5 percent during the
next. The tourist and agricultural export sectors were especially robust.
Moreover, the political environment in Kenya was very stable compared to its
neighbors: in Uganda, a military government wreaked havoc, and in Tanzania, a stri-
dent socialist experiment impoverished and isolated the country. But the lack of
downward accountability that defines authoritarianism bred vices such as corrup-
tion,
bureaucratic
failures, and massive misallocation of state resources. These faults
infiltrated the government’s management of economic affairs, and economic needs
were often subordinated to political goals. The limits of such a model first became
apparent in the first decade following independence; they were noted by Kenyans
who were ideologically repulsed by developments or who were being excluded
from the increasingly ethnically exclusive ruling class. Finally, the flaws became
evident nationally and internationally when egregious examples of corruption were
reported. According to Transparency International’s annual rankings between 1999
and 2003, Kenya ranked among the ten most corrupt countries in the world. Such
state decay devastated economic growth and government services; the formerly
robust GDP growth rate shrank to an average of 2.2 percent in the 1990s.

I N S T I T U T I O N S   A N D   F LU I D I T Y


Kenya’s independence in 1963 followed a series of tutored steps toward
sovereignty
, including the gradual expansion of African representation in the
Legislative Council, negotiated constitution making, and supervised inaugural
elections. This British tutelage extended a year into the independence period,
during which time the Queen of England served as a ceremonial head of state
until the country declared itself to be a presidential 
republic
on December 12,
1964. (It remained in the British Commonwealth, however.) The excitement
surrounding independence masked massive challenges that would constrain
the effectiveness of democratic institutions imposed at the last minute on a
people who had long been governed autocratically.
The main institutional focus in the new state was on constitutional restraint
of state power, primarily for two reasons. First, the new African government
needed to respond to concerns among the Europeans who still controlled the
economy and the critical farming sectors and were fearful of collapse and chaos.
Their fears were well-founded; the colonial government had long vilified the
incoming Kenya African National Union’s (KANU) prime minister, Jomo
Kenyatta, when he served as leader of the radical Mau Mau independence move-
ment, arresting and jailing him for seven years from 1952 to 1959 under the
emergency rule regulations. Second, the political competition among Africans
48

G O V E R N M E N T S   O F   T H E   W O R L D


K e n y a

K E N YA N   P R E S I D E N T S


■ ■ ■
Jomo Kenyatta, Kenya’s first
president, ruled the country for fifteen
years until his death in 1978. By
absorbing or ruthlessly suppressing
opposition parties, he also oversaw
the rise of the one-party state by
establishing a de facto one party.
Kenyatta was succeeded by his vice
president, Daniel arap Moi, who ruled
for twenty-four years. Becoming
increasingly repressive through the
1980s, Moi constitutionally outlawed
opposition parties in 1982 but was
forced by internal and external pres-
sure to revert to multiparty politics
in December 1991. He nevertheless
survived two subsequent elections.
On December 27, 2002, Kenyans
elected the country’s third president,
Mwai Kibaki (b. 1931), ending KANU’s
political monopoly.

socialism: 

any of various economic and
political theories advocating collective or
governmental ownership and administration
of the means of production and distribution
of goods

market economy: 

an economy with little
government ownership and relatively free
markets

bureaucracy: 

a system of administrating
government involving professional labor; the
mass of individuals administering government

sovereignty: 

autonomy; or, rule over a
political entity

republic: 

a form of democratic government
in which decisions are made by elected
representatives of the people
■ ■ ■  

G O V E R N M E N T S   O F   T H E   W O R L D


49
K e n y a

K E N YA’ S   E C O N O M Y


■ ■ ■
Like most other African
economies, Kenya depends upon a
narrow band of activities. Most
workers are employed in agriculture,
which contributes 20 percent of
GDP. Kenya is the world’s third
largest exporter of tea, which,
together with coffee and horticu-
ltural products, contributed over
50 percent of total merchandise
exports in 2002. The industrial sector
accounts for 18 percent of GDP and
services account for 60 percent.
Tourism, once a major economic
sector, has been adversely affected
by the instability of transition poli-
tics; however, it still contributes over
15 percent to the GDP.
that had occurred prior to independence had revealed the deep ethnic divisions
that had solidified under colonial rule; these rifts would destabilize democratic
rule in a winner-take-all parliamentary system.
The first concern was allayed by a significant deradicalization of the eco-
nomic policies of the KANU government. KANU elites—hardly any of whom
had actually been in the trenches of the Mau Mau 
insurgency
—distanced
themselves from the forceful rhetoric of the Mau Mau and promised not to
repossess forcefully any land from European settlers nor dismantle the civil
service. Kenyatta delivered his oft-repeated exhortation to “forgive but not
forget” to audiences across the country, including white farmers in the Rift
Valley’s agricultural heartland. He backed up his promise with the managed
land reform that took place under the Million Acres Scheme, among other
initiatives.
The second problem was addressed by constitutional arrangements; this
partial solution did not last long, however. At independence the constitution
provided for a 
federal
(majimbo) framework, with a local executive prime min-
ister and the British monarch as head of state. The constituent regions would
have significant 
decentralized
authority, including policing and taxing powers, to
give different ethnic groups preponderance in certain regions and limit the
feared Kikuyu dominance. The new state was also grounded in institutions such
as a bill of rights, separation of powers, and fiscal balance between regional and
central governments. In 1964, however, KANU dismantled the federal constitu-
tion, eliminated the powers of regional governments, and established a unitary
republic with an executive president. The party viewed federalism as an unnec-
essary and expensive constraint on its rightful power deriving from clear
supremacy in the independence elections.
Even as the country slid into authoritarianism after independence, how-
ever, the symbolism of constitutionalism persisted: Over the next thirty
years, the constitution was amended over thirty times. Except for the 1991
repeal of a previously adopted prohibition against political parties other than
KANU and a set of reforms enacted prior to the 1997 elections, all these
amendments restricted the liberties of individuals and groups and enhanced
the power of the executive branch at the expense of parliament and the
judiciary.
Even the amendment ushering in a multiparty system in 1991 did not fully
restore constitutional rule, as it left in place a number of laws that collectively
undermined liberal principles necessary for a functional democracy. These laws
included legal and administrative restrictions on free assembly, sedition laws,
and party registration mechanisms that were controlled by the executive
branch. Largely in response to these enduring constraints, constitutionalism
became integral to the struggle to deepen democracy. In an effort to secure
democratic gains, in 1999 the government launched a process to review and
rewrite the constitution, but it immediately became embroiled in controversy
over the process of reform and then over the substance of the proposals
offered. This conflict would persist for five years. As of February 2005, over
a decade since the return to electoral democracy, a new constitution had yet to
be adopted.
Even without a new constitution, however, important strides toward consti-
tutionalism had been made by establishing clear tenets related to the substance
and process of constitution making. For example, consensus was reached on
separation of powers, term limitation, and decentralization; controversy arose
only when politicians sought temporary exemption from the laws that they had
agreed ought to be universally binding. Despite slow progress toward substantive

insurgency: 

a rebellion against an existing
authority
■ ■ ■  

federalism: 

a system of political organiza-
tion, in which separate states or groups are
ruled by a dominant central authority on
some matters, but are otherwise permitted to
govern themselves independently

decentralize: 

to move power from a central
authority to multiple periphery government
branches or agencies

reforms, restraining state power through a broadly owned constitution remains a
priority for Kenyan political leaders.

C O N C LU S I O N


How Kenyans have experienced their government and the way it has man-
aged the country’s politics, society, and economy has changed significantly
through the colonial and postcolonial periods. Some challenges endure, even as
Kenyans have pursued universal goals and values such as 
democratization
, civil
society expansion, and a developmentalist state. The benefits (or woes) that
successive governments have brought their citizens seem to depend on a com-
bination of leadership and institutions, fortune and history. Increasingly,
support for democratization underscores Kenyans’ preference for the promise
of the former; yet occasional lapses such as the antigovernment riots in July
2004 underscore the inescapable weight of the latter.

See also: 


Transitional Political Systems.

B I B L I O G R A P H Y


Aubrey, Lisa. The Politics of Development Cooperation: NGOs, Gender and Partnership
in Kenya. London: Routledge, 1997.
Barkan, Joel D., ed. Beyond Capitalism versus Socialism in Kenya and Tanzania.
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994.
Harbeson, John W., ed. “The Future of Democracy in Kenya. Special issue.” Africa Today,
42, no. 2 (April–June 1998).
“Kenya.” CIA World Factbook 2004. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2004.
Ͻhttp://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ke.htmlϾ.
Miller, Norman, and Rodger Yaeger. Kenya: The Quest for Prosperity, 2d ed. Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1994.
Ndegwa, Stephen N. “Citizenship and Ethnicity: An Examination of Two Transition
Moments in Kenyan Politics.” American Political Science Review, 91, no. 3
(September 1997):599–616.
Ndegwa, Stephen N. “Kenya: Third Time Lucky?” Journal of Democracy, 14, no. 3 ( July
2003):145–158.
Ndegwa, Stephen N., and Ryan E. Letourneau. “Constitutional Reform,” In Democratic
Transitions in East Africa, eds. Paul J. Kaiser and F. Wafula Okumu. London:
Ashgate, 2004.
Ogot, B. A., and W. R. Ochieng, eds. Decolonization and Independence in Kenya,
1940–93. London: James Currey, 1995.
Orvis, Stephen. The Agrarian Question in Kenya. Gainesville: University Press of Florida,
1997.
Republic of Kenya. African Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya.
Sessional Paper, No. 10. Nairobi, Kenya: Government Printer, 1965. 
Shaw, Carolyn Martin. Colonial Inscriptions: Race, Sex, and Class in Kenya.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995.
Throup, David W., and Charles Hornsby. Multi-party Politics in Kenya: The Kenyatta and Moi
States and the Triumph of the System in the 1992 Election. London: James Currey, 1998.
Transparency International. Corruption Perceptions Index 2003. Berlin: Transparency
International, 2003. 
Ͻhttp://www.transparency.org/cpi/2003/cpi2003.en.htmlϾ.
The World Bank. “Kenya.” 
Ͻhttp://www.worldbank.orgϾ.
Stephen N. Ndegwa
50

G O V E R N M E N T S   O F   T H E   W O R L D


K e n y a

democratization: 

a process by which the
powers of government are moved to the
people of a region or to their elected
representatives
■ ■ ■  

King Jr., Martin Luther


A M E R I C A N   C I V I L   R I G H T S   A C T I V I S T   A N D   M I N I S T E R


1 9 2 9 – 1 9 6 8


Martin Luther King Jr., was born on January 15, 1929, the eldest son of a
family deeply rooted in the African-American social gospel tradition. His father
and maternal grandfather, both of whom were prominent Baptist ministers in
Atlanta, Georgia, viewed religious beliefs, social values, and political action
as the core of day-to-day living. Born Michael King Jr., King became known as
Martin Luther when his father, inspired by the Lutheran movement in
Germany, took that name. Early in life Martin struggled with his religious
beliefs, and he entered the ministry only after his exposure to a combination
of theology and social action while a student at Morehouse College. King
attended Crozier Theological Seminary in Pennsylvania and received a Ph.D.
from Boston University in 1955. In Boston, he met Coretta Scott (b. 1927), a
student at the New England Conservatory of Music, and they married on
June 18, 1953.
King became pastor of Dexter Avenue Baptist Church in Montgomery,
Alabama. There, following Rosa Parks’s well-publicized refusal to relinquish
her seat on a city bus, King began to translate his religious beliefs into social
action. Heading the Montgomery Improvement Association, King mobi-
lized black churches in support of Parks. Parishioners boycotted buses and
protested in public, using nonviolent civil disobedience, a tactic King had
adopted from India’s 
nationalist
leader Mahatma Gandhi (1869–1948). The
success of the boycott catapulted King to prominence. In 1957 he assumed a
national role in the movement for black equality, serving as the founding
president of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). Through
this group, King would become the inspirational focal point of the civil rights
movement.
Early in 1960 King moved his young and growing family—eventually he and
his wife would have four children—to Atlanta to manage the SCLC and become
co-pastor, with his father, of the Ebenezer Baptist Church. As the civil rights
movement evolved, King continued to put his leadership and dedication to civil
disobedience to the test. He was arrested at a protest during the summer of
1960, and his release following the intervention of then-presidential candidate
John F. Kennedy (1917–1963) became national news. In the 1963 Birmingham,
Alabama campaign, King led the largest civil rights protest in American history.
Televised coverage showing the use of guard dogs to quell the demonstrations
caused national outrage. On the heels of this coverage, President Kennedy
proposed a broad civil rights act that Congress later passed during the adminis-
tration of President Lyndon B. Johnson. 
The height of King’s influence came with his famous pronouncement at
the historic 1963 March on Washington: “I have a dream . . . that one day this
nation will rise up and live out the true meaning of its creed—we hold these
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal.” He proclaimed that
true equality would allow all Americans to sing, in the words of an old African-
American spiritual, “Free at last, free at last, thank God Almighty, we are free
at last.” King was named Time Magazine’s Man of the Year in 1963, and he
received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1964. Shortly thereafter, Congress passed
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965; King earned
recognition throughout the world as the principal civil rights leader in the
United States. 
Throughout the 1960s King worked to alleviate the plight of impoverished
African Americans in northern ghettos and opposed U.S involvement in the

G O V E R N M E N T S   O F   T H E   W O R L D


51
K i n g   J r . ,   M a r t i n   L u t h e r

nationalism: 

the belief that one’s nation or
culture is superior to all others
■ ■ ■  

Vietnam War (1964–1975). At times King found himself opposed by militant black
leaders who eschewed nonviolent action and by moderates who objected to his
melding of civil rights with the war issue. On April 4, 1968, King was assassinated
by James Earl Ray in Memphis, Tennessee, where he had traveled to lead a sani-
tation workers’ protest march. 
King’s legacy as leader of the modern civil rights movement resulted in,
among other honors, the creation of a Martin Luther King Jr. Center in Atlanta
and the establishment of a national holiday in his honor in 1986.

See also:


Civil Rights Movement in the United States; Racism.
52

G O V E R N M E N T S   O F   T H E   W O R L D


K i n g   J r . ,   M a r t i n   L u t h e r

IN OCTOBER 1960 DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. (CENTER) IS SURROUNDED BY HIS FAMILY


AFTER HIS RELEASE FROM GEORGIA’S STATE PRISON IN REIDSVILLE. 


Sentenced for four
months in prison following a traffic violation in 1960, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. was
freed after eight days with the aide of then-presidential candidate John F. Kennedy.
By that time, King had become well-known for his civil rights work using nonviolent
tactics.
(SOURCE: AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS)

B I B L I O G R A P H Y  


Garrow, David. Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference. New York: Harper Collins, 1986. 
Schulke, Flip. He Had a Dream: Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Civil Rights Movement.
New York: W. W. Norton, 1995. 
James W. Riddlesperger Jr.

Kiribati


Kiribati (pronounced kee-ree-bas) is a far-flung nation of islands in the
Pacific that straddles the Equator. It also straddled the international date line
until Kiribati passed legislation moving it to the country’s eastern border.
Moving the date line allowed Kiribati to become the first nation to greet the
coming of the new millennium in 2001. 
Kiribati is approximately halfway between Australia and Hawaii. Its thirty-
three coral atolls stretch 3,870 kilometers (2,360 miles) across, from the east-
ernmost of the Line Islands (Caroline) to its westernmost island (Banaba), and
2,050 kilometers (1,250 miles) from north to south. The land area of Kiribati
is only 719 square kilometers (266 square miles), out of a total of about
3.3 million kilometers (1.3 million square miles) of national territory, so most
of the country’s area is ocean. The capital of Kiribati is Tarawa, in the Gilbert
Islands group. Kiribati’s estimated population in 2003 was 98,549. Historically,
Kiribati derived much of its national income from phosphate mining on
Banaba, but the phosphate deposits were depleted by the
time Kiribati gained its independence from British rule in
1979. The principal sources of wealth for the country in the
early twenty-first century are fishing and copra exports, along
with tourism. Its per capita income in 2001 was estimated to
be U.S. $800, making Kiribati one of the poorest nations in the
Pacific region and, indeed, the world.
Kiribati became an independent nation and a full member
of the Commonwealth of Nations on July 12, 1979. Its consti-
tution provides for a president, a unicameral parliament (con-
sisting of forty-two members in 2003), and an independent
judiciary. Presidential candidates are nominated from among
the members of parliament to be elected in a national presi-
dential election by universal suffrage for a four-year term.
However, the president may be (and has been) removed from
office by a vote of no-confidence and replaced by a Council of
State until a new president is elected. The president is both
chief of state and head of government. The president
appoints a vice president and, from the membership of parlia-
ment, a cabinet of twelve members. The country’s first presi-
dent was Ieremia Tabai (b. 1950), the chief minister during the
colonial regime. Anote Tong (b. 1952) was elected president
in July 2003.
The judicial branch consists of a Court of Appeals, a High
Court, and Land and Magistrates courts at the bottom of the
judicial hierarchy. Residents of Banaba may appeal Court of
Appeals rulings to the Privy Council in London. The judiciary

G O V E R N M E N T S   O F   T H E   W O R L D


53
K i r i b a t i

North


West Point


South


West Point


Benson Point


North


East Point


Cape Manning


Aeon Point


South East Point


NORTH


PACIFIC


OCEAN


The Isles Lagoon


Fresh Water


Lagoons


Manulu Lagoon


Vaskess Bay


Bay of


Wrecks


Lagoon


M A R S H A L L


I S L A N D S


T U V A L U


PHOENIX ISLANDS


L IN


E  I


S L


A N


D


S


Butaritari


Marakei


Abaiang


Abemama


Nonouti


Beru


Arorae


Kanton


Kiritimati


Malden


Starbuck


Vostok


Caroline


Flint


Tabuaeran


Teraina


Enderbury


Rawaki


Manra


Baker I.


Palmyra Atoll


Howard I.


Maiana


Tabiteuea


Jarvis I.


Tamana


Orona


Nikumaroro


McKean


Birnie


Cook I.


Banaba


Poland
London
Banana
W
S
N
E

KIRIBATI


1,000 Miles
0
0
1000 Kilometers
500
500
10 Miles
0
0
10 Kilometers
5
5

KIRITIMATI


(CHRISTMAS I.)

Tarawa


(MAP BY MARYLAND CARTOGRAPHICS/ THE GALE GROUP)

has the reputation of being independent and the country generally enjoys the
rule of law
.
Freedom House’s 2003 analysis classified Kiribati as a free nation with the
highest levels of support for civil and political rights. The U.S. State Department
human rights report in 2003 also concluded that Kiribati’s government generally
respects its citizens’ rights. It did mention, however, some limits on freedom of
the press, a lack of economic opportunities for women, and the problem
of abuse directed at women and children in urban areas.

B I B L I O G R A P H Y


Banks, Arthur S., and William Overstreet. “Nauru.” Political Handbook of the World
1980. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980.
“Kiribati.” CIA World Factbook. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2005.
Ͻhttp://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/kr.htmlϾ.
“Kiribati.” Columbia Encyclopedia, 6th ed. 
Ͻhttp:www.bartleby.com/65/ki/Kiribati.html>.
Freedom House. “Kiribati.” Freedom in the World 2003: The Annual Survey of Political
Rights and Civil Liberties. New York: Freedom House, 2003. 
Ͻhttp://www.
freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/countryratings/kiribati.htm>.
U.S. Department of State. “Kiribati.” Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—2003.
Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2003. 
Ͻhttp://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/
hrrpt/2003/27773.htm
Ͼ.
C. Neal Tate

Korea, North


The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), or North Korea,
occupies the northern half of the Korean Peninsula, which juts out between
the Yellow Sea (also known as the Korea Bay) and the Sea of Japan. To the
north, the DPRK shares a 1,416-kilometer (880-mile) border—along the Yalu
and Tumen Rivers—with the People’s Republic of China, and a very short
19-kilometer (12-mile) border with Russia. North Korea’s most conspicuous
neighbor, however, is South Korea, which sits across a 238-kilometer
(148-mile) border running from east to west. The border between North and
South Korea, it is important to note, is no ordinary one. Known as the
Demilitarized Zone, or DMZ, it is one of the most intensely guarded and heav-
ily militarized borders in the world. Almost no human activity and develop-
ment exists within the 4-kilometer- (2.5-mile-) wide zone, but nearly 2 million
military personnel and a vast array of weaponry are positioned on both sides
of it. The DMZ symbolizes the long-standing hostility and distrust between the
two Koreas, which engaged in a brutal and highly destructive conflict (the
Korean War) from 1950 to 1953.
North Korea’s total area is 120,540 square kilometers (46,538 square
miles), which is a little larger than Cuba and slightly smaller than Greece. The
country has an estimated population of about 22.4 million, which is less than
half of its rival to the south. Population density in North Korea is a moderately
high 184 persons per square kilometer, which ranks fifty-seventh among the
world’s 236 countries and dependencies. However, because of its mountainous
topography (about 80 percent of North Korea’s land area is composed of
mountains and uplands), the population density is slightly understated.
54

G O V E R N M E N T S   O F   T H E   W O R L D


K o r e a ,   N o r t h

rule of law: 

the principle that the law is a
final grounds of decision-making and applies
equally to all people; law and order
■ ■ ■  

Pyongyang is North Korea’s capital and, with a population esti-
mated at 3.08 million at the end of 2003, it is the country’s
largest city (for many years, Pyongyang’s population was below
2.5 million, but it suddenly surged by 500,000 in the later half
of 2002).
North Korea is an ethnically and linguistically homogenous
society. Only a few Chinese and a handful of Japanese live in
North Korea, some of whom were forcibly abducted by North
Korean agents in the late 1970s and early 1980s. For most of its
short history, emigration and immigration were virtually non-
existent, although in the past few years North Korea’s borders
have become increasingly porous, especially along the Yalu
River, which separates North Korea from China.

B R I E F   P O L I T I C A L   H I S T O R Y


Although Korea has a long and complex history, including
thirty-five years of far-reaching occupation by Japanese colonial
authorities from 1910 to 1945, North Korea’s formal existence
dates back only to 1948, when, after three years of provisional
governance under “People’s Committees” (which were also set
up in South Korea but outlawed by the U.S. occupation authori-
ties) and relatively light-handed guidance on the part of Soviet
occupation authorities, an indigenous communist regime was
established. The new regime was led by Kim Il Sung
(1912–1994), who used his background as a leader of the only
“independent” anti-Japanese movement (i.e., a movement not
dependent on outside assistance) and his immense political skills
to gradually build an unchallengeable power base after the divi-
sion of the country in 1945.
The DPRK was formally established on September 9, 1948.
Kim Il Sung was named premier, and, after a constitutional
change in 1972, became president, a position he held until his
death in 1994. During his time in power, Kim Il Sung oversaw an immense amount
of change in North Korea, much of which has turned out to have profoundly neg-
ative consequences. In particular, Kim attempted to construct a “self-reliant” com-
munist system with uniquely Korean characteristics. This effort is epitomized in
the concept of juche, which, according to the DPRK Constitution, is “a revolution-
ary 
ideology
with a people-centered view of the world that aims to realize the
independence of the masses, the guiding principle of its actions” (Handbook
1996, p. 11).
Unfortunately, the policies of self-reliance, much of which involved the
adoption of independent economic and military strategies, had largely the
opposite result; namely, North Korea became increasingly dependent on the
outside world, and particularly on other communist countries, for vital
resources (especially fuel), foodstuffs, and capital goods. The collapse of the
Soviet Union in 1989 unequivocally exposed the weaknesses of the juche sys-
tem, but, significantly, it did not immediately destabilize the North Korean
political system. Indeed, since 1989 and despite chronic shortages of fuel and
electricity, long-term economic stagnation, and, most important, periodic
bouts of famine, the regime has remained firmly in control. This is partly due
to the DPRK’s disproportionately large military and security apparatus, which
has been thoroughly integrated in North Korean society, but also partly due to

G O V E R N M E N T S   O F   T H E   W O R L D


55
K o r e a ,   N o r t h

ideology: 

a system of beliefs composed of
ideas or values, from which political, social,
or economic programs are often derived
■ ■ ■  

N


A


N


G


N


IM


S


A


N


M


A


E


K


Paektu San


9,003 ft.


2744 m.


Musu Dan


Demarcation Line


July 27, 1953


CH


AN


G


BA


I


SH


A


N


Korea


Bay


Sea of Japan


Sup'ung-ho


Changjin


Reservoir


Sojoson-


man


Kyonggi-man


Tongjoson-man


Yellow


Sea


Im


ji


n


T a


ed


on


g


C


ho


ng


ch


on


Y


al


u


C


h


a


n


gj


in


Tum


e n


Onsong
Najin
Musan
Hyesan
Kilchu
Tanch'on
P'umgsan
Sinp'o
Kanggye
Liangshui
Manp'o
Kusong
Kowon
Sariwon
Haeju
Changyon
Ongjin
Pyonggang
Kimch'aek

P'yongyang


Ch'ongjin


Namp'o


Sinuiju


Hungnam


ù


Wonsan
Kaesong

C H I N A


SOUTH KOREA


North Korea


W
S
N
E

NORTH KOREA


150 Miles
0
0
150 Kilometers
50
100
100
50
˘
˘
˘
˘
˘
˘
˘
˘
(MAP BY MARYLAND CARTOGRAPHICS/ THE GALE GROUP)

ideological indoctrination and insular policies that have isolated the North
Korean people from the rest of the world.
Following Kim Il Sung’s death, which was due to natural causes, Kim’s
son, Kim Jong Il (b. 1942) took power. The younger Kim was named General
Secretary of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) in October 1997; a year later, he
was reconfirmed as chairman of the National Defense Commission, the high-
est office of state in North Korea. The accession of Kim Jong Il was no acci-
dent. The elder Kim, according to most observers, began preparing his son to
succeed him as early as 1971. Over two decades, the younger Kim was given
positions of increasing importance and authority, culminating with his desig-
nation as supreme commander of the Korean People’s Army in December
1991. When Kim Jong Il finally assumed formal control of North Korea, it
marked the first dynastic succession ever in a communist regime. It should be
noted, however, that Kim Jong Il’s accession was not a foregone conclusion.
In fact, it took three years after his father’s death until he assumed complete
control.
With only one major leadership transition in its first fifty years of exis-
tence, North Korea’s political system is tightly controlled. Indeed, North
Korea in practice has been a 
totalitarian
dictatorship. Accordingly, political,
social, and economic power in North Korea is highly 
centralized
, although due
to the extremely opaque nature of the North Korean regime, it is difficult to
say exactly how power and authority is distributed and exercised. What is
clear, however, is that the military and the KWP have been the two key politi-
cal institutions in North Korea since the country’s inception.
In the early years, the KWP played an instrumental and more autonomous
role in North Korean politics as various leaders, including Kim Il Sung, vied for
control of the 
party apparatus
. By 1960, Kim had succeeded in purging all his
rivals, and thereafter he was able to completely dominate the KWP. Since then,
the KWP has served as the primary vehicle of policy making in North Korea.
It operates through the national party congress, which is the supreme party
organ. The party congress approves reports of the party organs, adopts basic
party policies and tactics, and elects members to the KWP Central Committee
and the Central Auditing Committee. Although North Korea also has a formal
governmental structure—with a prime minister, a cabinet called the Central
People’s Committee, and a parliament (the Supreme People’s Assembly)—most
observers agree that none of the officials besides Kim Jong Il has real power.
To a certain extent, the same can be said of the KWP, whose core membership
has been handpicked by Kim Jong Il and a few loyal lieutenants.
The sheer size of North Korea’s military—the fourth largest standing army
in the world with an estimated 1.2 million soldiers—makes it a pivotal political
and institutional force. Even more important, the North Korean army has, from
the country’s inception, been tightly integrated into the North Korean political
system. It served as the essential base of power for Kim Il Sung and was a
cornerstone of Kim’s concept of juche, which was based as much on military
self-reliance as economic self-reliance.
Since Kim Jong Il assumed power, moreover, the military has become even
more entrenched. This is reflected in the status of the National Defense
Commission, which not only exercises direct control over North Korea’s armed
forces, but is also, in practice, the highest state body in the country. As chairman
of the National Defense Committee, therefore, Kim Jong Il became vested with
supreme executive power. In this regard, it is worth noting that, unlike many
other military-dominated dictatorships, the autonomy of the North Korean
army has, for the most part, been held in check. In fact, there has never been
56

G O V E R N M E N T S   O F   T H E   W O R L D


K o r e a ,   N o r t h

totalitarianism: 

a form of absolute govern-
ment that demands complete subjugation by
its citizens

centralize: 

to move control or power to a
single point of authority
■ ■ ■  


Do'stlaringiz bilan baham:

©2018 Учебные документы
Рады что Вы стали частью нашего образовательного сообщества.
?


cherchill--ford--uoker-22.html

cherchill--ford--uoker-27.html

cherchill--ford--uoker-31.html

cherchill--ford--uoker-36.html

cherchill--ford--uoker-40.html